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INTRODUCTION

The Texas law of groundwater,' compared with the Texas law of
* This article is a revision and expansion of an outline prepared for the University of
Texas Law School Water Law Conference on October 3 & 4, 1985.
** Edward Clark Centennial Professor of Law, University of Texas Law School, Austin,
Texas; B.A., J.D., State University of Iowa.
1. The term "groundwater" is used herein as excluding water in underground water-
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surface watercourses and with groundwater law of other western
states, is characterized by huge voids. The historic stance of the
Supreme Court of Texas is one of non-involvement in conflicts over
groundwater. Its hands-off position is justified, it has asserted, by the
complexity of groundwater and its problems.2 Management of
groundwater is appropriately a problem for the legislature, the court
has declared.' The Texas Legislature, however, has been slow to accept the challenge. In the main, the legislature has passed the buck to
local communities by authorizing them to do something about
groundwater if they wish to do so.4 The response of local communities has been uneven and generally inadequate.
II.

THE MAJOR VOIDS

The major voids in Texas groundwater law have been identified and
discussed elsewhere. 5 They will only be summarized briefly here.
A.

No Judicial Protection of Water Wells From Lowering of
Water Levels by Pumping of Other Wells

In 1904, in Houston & T C Ry. Co. v. East,6 the Supreme Court of
Texas held that the owner of a domestic water well was not entitled to
damages for the drying up of his well by heavy pumping of a new,
large water well nearby for railroad uses.7 The sole remedy of the
courses and underflow of surface watercourses. It is that class of water referred to by courts as
"percolating" water.
2. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 148-49, 81 S.W. 279, 280-81 (1904).
See generally Castleberry, A Proposalfor Adoption of a Legal Doctrineof Ground-Stream Water
Interrelationshipin Texas, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 514 (1975); Johnson, Texas Groundwater
Laws: A Survey and Some Proposals,22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017, 1018 (1982); Note, Water
Law-Underground Water Users Are Liable for Subsidence Proximately Caused by Negligent
Drillingor Production, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1193, 1195 (1979).
3. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 148-49, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (1904); see
also City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 296, 276 S.W.2d 798, 803
(1955).
4. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.001 et seq. (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1986). See
Johnson, Texas GroundwaterLaws: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J.
1017, 1020 (1982).
5. E.g., Johnson, Texas Groundwater Law: A Survey and Some Proposals,22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017 (1982).

6. 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904).
7. See id. at 148-49, 81 S.W. at 280-81. In East, the defendant railroad company dug a

well to produce water to be used by its locomotives and machine shops. The well was supplied
entirely by percolating water.
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injured well owner, the court implied, was self-help, i.e., construction
of a well powerful enough to pull water from the railroad's well-a
prohibitively expensive remedy for one who needs water only for
household uses.' Although this position has been much criticized,
even by Justices of the Supreme Court of Texas, and has been rejected
by courts or legislatures of western states and some eastern states,9 it
remains Texas law. The Supreme Court of Texas expressly reaffirmed
the East decision in 1955 in City of Corpus Christi v. City of
Pleasanton.'o
Nor has the Texas Legislature departed significantly from East.
The Texas Legislature has authorized the creation of underground
water conservation districts11 with power to require spacing of water
wells and regulate pumping, 12 but many wells are outside such districts and there is no assurance of effective regulation by local
districts. 13
B.

No Judicial Protection of Surface Watercourses from
Reduction of Flow by Pumping of Wells

The logic of East was applied by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
in 1954 to deny relief to owners of water rights in a stream for drastic
14
reduction of stream flow caused by pumping of water wells.
Groundwater rights and surface water rights were viewed by the
court as separate legal regimes, despite hydrological relationships. 5
The consequence is de-stabilization of long-existing vested water
rights.
C. Grossly Inadequate Sanctions Against Waste
The Supreme Court of Texas concluded in 1955 that no judicial
doctrine or statute would forbid pumping hugh quanities of water
8. See id. at 151-52, 81 S.W.2d at 282.
9. See Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 505, 509-14
(1982) (compiling state statutes and case law rejecting East doctrine).
10. 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955).
11. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.001 et seq. (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1986).
12. See id. § 52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
13. Cf. id. §§ 52.021 to -.026 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1986). See generally Comment,
Ground. Water Management: A Proposal for Texas, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 289, 294-99 (1973).
14. See Pecos County Water Control & Improvement District No. I v. Williams, 271
S.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. See id. at 505-06.
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from wells into a stream for transport for use at a distant place, despite loss in transit of most of the well water. 16 Judicial doctrine
would forbid only "wanton or willful" waste, 17 and the only pertinent
statute would forbid such an escape of water from beneficial use only
if the water is artesian water and the loss is 100%,18 according to this
decision. However, wells located within groundwater districts may be
subject to more stringent regulations.I9
D.

No Stated Policy on the Proper Rate of Aquifer Depletion

Although most pumping of groundwater in Texas exceeds rates of
natural recharge of aquifers, 20 neither the Texas Legislature nor any
state agency has formulated a policy to address this situation.

Groundwater districts have authority to adopt aquifer depletion policies,2 but typically the districts lack jurisdiction over sufficient portions of aquifers and their constituents are not likely to support
aquifer protection programs that restrict their pumping. 22 Needed are
policies and programs to (1) preserve indefinitely aquifers that have
substantial rates of natural recharge, and (2) deplete at an optimum
rate, with due regard for future generations, aquifers with such slight
natural recharge that they must be mined in order to be utilized.
These are exceedingly difficult tasks, but they have been undertaken
16. See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 297, 276 S.W.2d 798,
803-04 (1955).
17. See id. at 293-94, 276 S.W.2d at 801-02. For a discussion on the City of Corpus
Christi case, see generally Johnson, Texas GroundwaterLaw: A Survey and Some Proposals,22
NAT. RESOURCES J. 1017, 1018 (1982); and Johnson, Legal Assurances of Adequate Flows of
Fresh Water into Texas Bays and Estuaries to Maintain Proper Salinity Levels, 10 Hous. L.
REV. 598, 619-20 (1973).
18. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.205 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
19. See id. §§ 52.101, 52.117. Per section 52.101: "[a] district may make and enforce
rules to provide for conserving, preserving, protecting, recharging, controlling subsidence, and
preventing waste of the underground water of an underground water reservoir or its subdivisions." Id. § 52.010. Section 52.117 states: "[iun order to minimize as far as practicable the
draw down of the water table or the reduction of artesian pressure, to control subsidence, or to
prevent waste, the district may provide for the spacing of water wells and may regulate the
production of wells." Id. § 52.117. The district may require permits for the drilling, equipping, or competing of wells. See id. § 52.114 (Vernon 1972). Finally, the district may require
open or uncovered wells to be capped when they are not in use. See id. § 52.119.
20. See II WATER FOR TEXAS, TECHNICAL APPENDIX II-10 (Tex. Dept. Water Resources 1984).
21. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 52.101, 52.117(Vernon Supp. 1986).
22. See Comment, Ground Water Management: A Proposalfor Texas, 52 TEXAS L. REV.
289, 294-99 (1973).
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by some western states.2 3
III.

SOME LIMITED VOID-FILLING

There have been some apparent recent beginnings, in both the judicial and legislative branches, to fill some of the voids in Texas groundwater law.
A.

Judicial Actions

In Friendwood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries,
Inc.,24 the Supreme Court of Texas announced that subsidence of land
due to the negligent pumping of water wells thereafter would be actionable.2 5 The Friendswood court concluded, however, that stare decisis required that the no-liability rule of East be applied to pre-1978
subsidence.2 6 An intriguing and important question suggested by
Friendswoodis whether it will lead to a total rejection in Texas of the
English doctrine of groundwater ownership as represented in East. In
its opinion, the Friendswood court pointed to Texas statutes authorizing underground water conservation districts.2 7 This was said by the
court to constitute an assumption of its "proper role" by the legislature, which the court applauded.28 The court also stated that it
agreed that "some aspects" of the English rule are "harsh and
outmoded."2 9
One conceivably could read the Friendswood opinion as meaning
that the court feels that, the legislature having acted, the next move is
up to the court. I do not read the Friendswood opinion that broadly.
No land involved in Friendswoodwas situated within an underground
water conservation district, nor was any regulation by such a district
in any manner involved. I do not find in the Friendswood opinion any
reasonable basis for predicting that the court will overrule East at the
next opportunity. The process of judicial void-filling may have both

23. See Fundlingsland v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 468 P.2d 835, 839 (Colo.
1970); see also Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 421 P.2d 771, 775-76 (N.M. 1966). See generally
Aiken, Ground Water Mining Law and Policy, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 505, 514-18 (1982).
24. 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
25. See id. at 28.
26. See id. at 28-30.
27. See id. at 29-30.
28. See id. at 30.
29. See id. at 28.
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begun and ended with Friendswood-insofaras the East doctrine is
concerned.
B.

Legislative Actions

The recent session of the Texas Legislature also engaged in some
conditional void-filling of Texas groundwater law. After the adoption
of a proposed constitutional amendment,3 ° chapter 13331 strengthened
the Water Code provisions concerning underground water conservation districts. The bill's salient points include:
1. Creation of districts is encouraged by authorizing the Texas
Water Commission to require local elections to create new districts or
enlarge existing districts in areas determined by it to be "critical areas." An incentive to vote in favor of such proposals is provided:
cities, counties, and water districts in such areas will be ineligible to
receive state financial assistance for water projects if the voters reject
the district.32
2. The boundaries of districts may be broader and more
3
realistic.
3. The capacity of wells subject to permit requirements has been
reduced from 100,000 gallons per day to 25,000 gallons per day. It is
mandatory that permits for such wells be obtained, but wells that produce no more than 100,000 gallons per day are entitled automatically
to permits, and the standards for passing upon applications for permits remain discretionary with the district. However, if a district
were to apply for state financial assistance, it would be subject to a
general requirement of the act that the applicant adopt a program of
water conservation meeting the Texas Water Development Board's
30. See Act of May 8, 1985, TEX. H.R.J. RES. 6, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. A-100
(Vernon). This amendment was adopted by the Texas electorate on November 5, 1985, by
their approval of the following proposition:
The constitutional amendment to authorize the issuance of an additional $980 million of

Texas Water Development Bond, to create special water funds for water conservation,
water development, water quality enhancement, flood control, drainage, subsidence control, recharge, chloride control, agricultural soil and water conservation, and desalinization, to authorize a bond insurance program, and to clarify the purposes for which Texas

Water Development Bonds may be issued.
Id. at A-100

31. See Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 133, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 630 (Vernon) (codified
at TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 1.002 to 66.404 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
32. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.0611 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
33. See id. §§ 52.053, 52.060.
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standards.34
4. The definition of "waste" is broadened to include negligent, as
well as willful, escape of groundwater. 35
5. Districts are authorized to purchase, sell, transport, and disconjunctive use
tribute surface or groundwater-which may facilitate
36
projects.
recharge
of
of such waters and initiation
Significant shortcomings still remain. The legislature declined to
authorize any state agency to create districts without favorable elections or to regulate in rejecting district formation. It also declined to
authorize any state agency to establish standards for district regulations or otherwise assure their adequacy. An existing district cannot
be expanded unless the voters in each area-the existing district and
the proposed annexation-approve. 37 Furthermore, no protection of
watercourses from well pumping is provided.
A new provision in the Texas Water Code allows state agencies to
exempt their state-owned land from district control. 38 This amounts
to a legislative assumption that the missions of agencies managing
state-owned lands are more important than groundwater management. The act does require that any agency electing not to include
state-owned land within a district must establish its own groundwater
management plan.3 9 The provision is silent, however, as to the elements of such a plan, how it would be coordinated with district programs, and how this mandate to state agencies is to be enforced.
In general, the new groundwater legislation expands the involvement of state agencies in groundwater management, but the impor4
tant decision-making process still remains with local communities. 0
State agencies must rely upon the carrot of financial assistance for
water projects. 4' The effectiveness of that carrot remains to be seen.
Even if it works as contemplated by the act, the role of state agencies
in groundwater management will still be severely limited in the respects discussed in part II of this article.
34. See id. § 52.170.
35. See id. § 52.001(7).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

§ 52.156.
§ 52.060(g).
§ 52.063.
§ 52.063.
§§ 52.000 et. seq. (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1986).
§ 52.0611 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY AS OBSTACLES TO REFORM

There are many possible explanations for the reluctance of the
Texas Legislature to act directly to fill the voids of groundwater law.
One conceivable explanation is that legislative leaders, or their constituents, believe that property rights of landowners in groundwater
cannot be substantially modified by the legislature without violating
state and federal constitutions. This view has been expressed often,
though usually by those who fear that their personal interests would
be threatened by legislation. Those expressions may be dismissed
lightly. But when public officials make the same assertion, as some
have done,4 2 it must be taken seriously.
A.

The Term "Absolute Ownership"

The judicial doctrine of groundwater in force in Texas is referred to
as the "English" rule and sometimes as the "absolute ownership"
rule.4 3 The latter term may conjure up in one's mind the notion that
groundwater ownership in Texas is a super-right subject to no limitations whatever, even legislative control. The context in which the
term "absolute ownership" has been used by courts and commentators shows that it has an entirely different meaning.' Its function is
42. See II WATER FOR TEXAS, TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1-16 (Tex. Dept. Water Resources
1984). The Texas Water Plan states:
Texas courts have followed unequivocally the "English" or "common law" rule that the
landowner has a right to take for use or sale all the water he can capture from beneath his
land. The judiciary early chose not to adopt the "American rule" with respect to groundwater, which is based on "reasonable use" and correlative rights. Consequently, neither
an injured neighbor nor the State can effectively exercise control over water-use practices
involving ground water.
Id. at 1-16 (emphasis added).
43. See, e.g., City of Sherman v. Public Util. Comm'n, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex. 1983)
("absolute ownership" theory regarding groundwater remains law today); Friendswood Dev.
Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25-27 (Tex. 1978) ("English" rule of "absolute
ownership" applied); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292-93, 276
S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (1955) (court follows "English" rule). See generally Castleberry, A Proposal for Adoption of a Legal Doctrineof Ground-Stream Water Interrelationshipin Texas, 7 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 503, 505-10 (1975); Tyler, Underground Water Regulation in Texas, 39 TEX. B.J.
532, 532-36 (1976); Note, Water Law-Underground Water Users Are Liable for Subsidence
Proximately Caused by Negligent Drilling or Production, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1193, 1195-99
(1979).
44. See Aiken, Nebraska GroundwaterLaw and Administration, 59 NEB. L. REV. 917,
923-24 (1980); Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property,54 U. CINN. L.
REV. 67, 67-68 (1985). The notion that property rights are "absolute" in the sense that they
are beyond the reach of governmental power often has been attributed to Blackstone's Com-
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to distinguish the English rule from the "American" or "reasonable
use" rule. The "American" rule places restrictions on the right of a
landowner to pump groundwater, which accordingly is not "absolute."4 5 The "English" rule places almost no limitations upon the
4' 6
right to pump and only in this respect may be said to be "absolute.
The corollary of this rule is that the landowner is entitled to no judicial protection from harmful pumping by others.47 Thus, his "ownership" lacks one of the most significant aspects of ownership. It
certainly is not "absolute" in the sense that it is comprehensive.
In fact, the Supreme Court of Texas has rarely referred to its
groundwater rule as the "absolute ownership" doctrine. The first
time it did so, ironically, was in 1978, in its opinion in Friendswood,
which imposed a new qualification on the right to pump groundwater
and thus making even it no longer "absolute." 4 8 In East, the leading
Texas case on the subject, the court's opinion showed that the court
was more concerned with the practical effects of its decision than with
its conceptual underpinning. 9 The East court's principal concern
was that as of 1904 there was insufficient knowledge about the nature
of groundwater to enable courts to manage the resource compe-

mentaries on the law of England. A recent scholarly article concludes that this is a mistaken
attribution. See Bums, Blackstone's Theory of the "Absolute" Rights of Property,54 U. CINN.
L. REV. 67, 67-68 (1985).
45. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25 (Tex. 1978);
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800-01
(1955). See generally Aiken, Nebraska Groundwater Law and Administration, 59 NEB. L.
REV. 917, 924-25 (1980); Tarlock, Supplemental GroundwaterIrrigationLaw: From Capture
to Sharing, 73 Ky. L.J. 695, 703 (1985); Note, Water Law-Underground Water Users Are
Liablefor Subsidence Proximately Caused by Negligence Drillingor Production, 10 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1979).
46. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 24-26 (Tex.
1978); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 293-94, 276 S.W.2d 798,
800-02 (1955). See generally Aiken, Nebraska GroundwaterLaw and Administration, 59 NEB.
L. REV. 917, 923-24 (1980); Castleberry, A Proposalfor Adoption of a Legal Doctrine of
Ground-Stream Water Interrelationship,7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 505-06 (1975); Tarlock, Supplemental Groundwater Irrigation Law: From Capture to Sharing, 73 Ky. L.J. 695, 701-04
(1985); Note, Water Law-Underground Water Users Are Liable for Subsidence Proximately
Caused by Negligent Drilling or Production, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1193, 1194-95 (1979).
47. See City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828, 840 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 385 U.S. 35
(1966); City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 293, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800
(1955); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279, 280 (1904).
48. See Friendswood Dev. Co., v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25-26 (Tex.
1978).
49. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 149, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (1904).
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tently.5 ° The East court also objected to the aspect of the "reasonable
use" doctrine that restricts use of water to the overlying land." The
court's sole reference to the proprietary interest of a landowner 52
in
groundwater was a quotation from an opinion by a New York court.
Even that quotation did not use the adjective "absolute."
B.

Corporeal Ownership

Both the "absolute ownership" rule and the "reasonable use" rule
5 3
recognize that the landowner owns the corpus of the groundwater.
In this respect, they are to be distinguished from a third rule, which
may be referred to as the "usufructuary" rule. According to this rule,
a landowner only has a right to seek groundwater, which he becomes
the owner of only when he reduces it to actual possession. 5 4 This
rationale has been adopted in Louisiana,55 Florida,56 and Arizona. 7
The Supreme Court of Arizona, which earlier treated the landowner
as the owner of the corpus of the groundwater, has changed its position and now adheres to the usufructuary rule. 8 The Supreme Court
of South Dakota, holding that the legislature could lawfully, without
compensation, abolish the absolute ownership rule and substitute for
it prior appropriation, viewed the absolute ownership doctrine as a
misnomer for the usufructuary rule.5 9
There still seems to be some vitality in the notion that ownership of
the corpus of groundwater is not as amenable to legislative change as
is ownership of a right to capture groundwater. That appears to be
the view of the Arizona court, which apparently regarded its decision
upholding sweeping legislative changes in groundwater law as better
supported if the usufructuary doctrine were in force, which it
50. See id. at 149, 81 S.W. at 281.
51. See id. at 149-50, 81 S.W. at 281.
52. See id. at 150, 81 S.W. at 281 (quoting Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 526 (N.Y.
1866)).
53. See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 25-27 (Tex.
1978); Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 149, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (1904).
54. See Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Co., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla. 1979).
55. See Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. Ct. App.), writ ref'd, 153 So. 2d 880
(La. 1963).
56. See Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Co., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla. 1979).
57. See Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Ariz. 1982).
58. See id. at 1328.
59. See Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964).
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promptly declared to be in force.6 °
The view taken by the Arizona court does not stand up well under
rigorous analysis or by reference to the judicial authorities. Both corporeal ownership and usufructory ownership are subject to the police
power. In upholding regulation of oil and gas, the Supreme Court of
Texas addressed this supposed distinction, and concluded that corporeal ownership of oil and gas nevertheless is subject to regulationapparently to the full extent of the police power. 61 In Beckendorff v.
Harris-Galveston CoastalSubsidence District,62 the validity of groundwater regulation provisions of the Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District Act was upheld without even addressing the supposed
resistance of corporeal groundwater ownership to legislative
regulations.
It also should be pointed out that all of the decisions by the
Supreme Court of Texas relying upon the rationale that the landowner owns groundwater in the same way he owns soil could have
been based upon the usufructuary rationale. East and City of Corpus
Christiboth held that a landowner may draw down water in the wells
of others without liability; 63 the same result is reached by reasoning
that no one owns groundwater until it is captured. The corporeal
ownership concept was also relied upon in a decision that a suit could
be maintained to recover the agreed consideration for conveyance of
plaintiff's interests in groundwater. 6' The defendant had argued that
plaintiff did not own the water rights he had contracted to convey.65
The court declared that the landowner had "exclusive property" in
the groundwater.6 6 Here also the decision could have been grounded
upon the usufructuary concept, as one could convey a right to capture.6 7 Indeed, in this very opinion, the court held that a conveyance
of appropriative rights in a surface stream by one who had no such
rights would be effective nevertheless to convey the grantor's opportu-

60. See Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328-30 (Ariz. 1982).
61. See Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 306, 83 S.W.2d 935, 940-41
(1935).
62. 558 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. See Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 149, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (1904); City
of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 292, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1955).
64. See Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 29-30, 296 S.W. 273, 278 (1927).
65. See id. at 29-30, 296 S.W. at 278.
66. See id. at 29-30, 296 S.W.2d at 278.
67. See Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1326, 1328 (Ariz. 1982);
Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. Ct. App.), writ ref'd, 153 So. 2d 88 (La. 1963).
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nity to acquire such rights.68
If one takes the view that stare decisis is applicable to the decision
of a case and not necessarily to the rationale for that decision, 69 it
would be proper for the Supreme Court of Texas to announce in the
next case before it involving this issue that it is rejecting the corporeal
ownership rationale in favor of the usufructuary rationale, as the Arizona court did. I hasten to add that I am not recommending that it
do this, as I consider it unnecessary and also possibly a source of confusion, especially for Texas oil and gas law, which incorporates the
East rationale.7 0 It is also conceivable that such a move by the
Supreme Court of Texas would deprive farmers on the High Plains of
their right to cost depletion under the income tax provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code for groundwater mining.7 '
There is a possibility that the "usufructuary" concept of groundwater ownership already applies to some parts of Texas, namely,
lands granted by Spain or Mexico. The Supreme Court of Texas has
held that grantees of Texas land from Spain and Mexico did not receive implied irrigation rights in perennial12 or nonperennia 73 streams
as incidents of their land grants. It has also been held that establishment of a Spanish pueblo in what is now Texas did not impliedly
convey water rights to the pueblo. 4 It would be consistent with
those decisions to hold that Spanish and Mexican grants carried with
them no implied grants of rights in groundwater. The opinion of the
Supreme Court of Texas in Adjudication of Water Rights in the Medina River Watershed of San Antonio River Basin, 5 refers to an express Spanish grant in Mexico to Hernan Cortes of "percolating
waters."1 6 Such evidence has been relied upon in the Texas cases as

68. See Texas Co. v. Burkett, 117 Tex. 16, 27, 296 S.W. 273, 277 (1927).
69. See Goodhart, Three Cases on Possession, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 195 (1928).
70. See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 582, 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948).
71. See United States v. Shurbet, 347 F.2d 103, 106-07 (5th Cir. 1965).
72. See Valmont Plantations v. Texas, 346 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1961), aff'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962).
73. See In re Adjudication of Water Rights in the Medina River Watershed of the San
Antonio River Basin, 670 S.W.2d 250, 252-53 (Tex. 1984).
74. See In re Contests of the City of Laredo, et al, To the Adjudication of Water Rights in
the Middle Rio Grande Basin and Contributing Texas Tributaries, 675 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
75. 670 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. 1984).
76. See id. at 253.
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negating implied water rights.77
C.

Legislative Recognition of Landowner Ownership
of Groundwater

Landowners cannot claim a super-right in groundwater by virtue of
constitutional or legislative grant. There is no relevant constitutional
provision, and the pertinent statutes do no more than acquiesce in the
court decisions. For example, section 52.002 of the Texas Water
Code states:
The ownership and rights of the owner of land and his lessees and assigns in underground water are hereby recognized, and nothing in this
code shall be construed as depriving or divesting the owner of his lessees and assigns of the ownership of rights, subject to the rules promulgated by a district under this chapter. 8

Certainly the Supreme Court of Texas did not view this statute as any
sort of restraint upon its power to modify groundwater ownership in
the Friendswood case.79

D. The Absence of a Legislative Declaration of State
"Ownership" of Groundwater
The Texas Legislature based its adoption of the prior appropriation
system for watercourses on a declaration of state ownership of such
waters.8 0 This could be thought to make appropriative rights in watercourses more amenable to legislative change than groundwater
ownership. But if the legislature could declare that the state "owns"
water in watercourses, and the Supreme Court of Texas could conclude that this declaration was not in derogation of common-law ripa77. See Valmont Plantations v. Texas, 346 S.W.2d 853, 878 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1961), aff'd, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962); see also In re Adjudication of
Water Rights in the Medina River Watershed of the San Antonio River Basin, 670 S.W.2d
250, 252 (Tex. 1984).
78. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
79. See Friendswood Dev. Co., v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex.

1978).
80. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.021 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Section 11.021 states in
the pertinent part:
[T]he water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, natural
stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of Mexico, and the storm water,
floodwater, and rainwater of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and

watershed in the state is the property of the State.
Id. § 11.021.
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rian rights, as it did in Mot v. Boyd,8 it is at least possible that a
legislative declaration today of state ownership of groundwater would
be reconciled somehow with the rights of landowners. However that
may be, effective regulation of groundwater does not require a legislative declaration of state ownership of such water. Regulation of
groundwater in Texas by districts is not based upon state ownership. 2
In addition, common-law riparian rights have been brought within
the water rights adjudication systems and coordinated with appropriative rights without a declaration that riparian rights are owned by
the state.83 It should be clear that legislative declaration of state ownership is of little or no relevance to the scope of legislative power to
modify these water rights.
E.

The Non-Applicability of the Public Trust Doctrine
to Groundwater

In In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe
Segment of the Guadalupe River Basin, 4 upholding substantial legislative alteration of riparian rights, the Supreme Court of Texas relied
in part upon the doctrine that all navigable waters, including those
made navigable by statute, are owned by the State in trust for the
public. 5 It follows, said the court, that the vested rights of riparians
'8 6
are merely rights to a "usufructory use of what the State owns."
The opinion implied that such usufructuary rights may more readily
be altered than other rights. Since groundwater is not navigable, and

81. 116 Tex. 82, 127, 286 S.W. 458, 474-75 (1926).
82. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 52.002 (Vernon Supp. 1986).

83. See In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the
Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 442-46 (Tex, 1982).
84. 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).
85. See id. at 444.
86. See id. at 444. Note that the term "usufructary" was used by the court in a different

sense from its use in Arizona, Florida, and Louisiana groundwater cases. See Town of Chino
Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1328 (Ariz. 1982); Village of Tequesta v. Jupitor
Inlet Co., 371 So. 2d 663, 667 (Fla. 1979); Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. Ct.

App.), writ ref'd, 153 So. 2d 880 (La. 1963). Those opinions relied, not upon the public trust
theory, but upon the theory that groundwater is not owned by anyone, including the sovereign,
until it is reduced to possession. Water in surface watercourses has also been viewed as

unowned and part of the "negative community." It has been suggested that these are merely
different formulations of a single theory. See 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN UNITED
STATES §§ 6, 7 (1911). But there may be an important distinction for groundwater. The nonownership (negative community) concept has not been stated as restricted to navigable waters.
The public trust doctrine has been so restricted, at least by the courts of Texas and other states.
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therefore presumably is not subject to the public trust doctrine, it may
be supposed that groundwater rights are not as subject to legislative
change as are riparian rights in navigable waters. However, the court
elsewhere in its opinion relied upon the general police power of the
legislature and did so in terms that leave no doubt that even "absolute
and unqualified" water rights are subject to extensive legislative control. 7 The court's reliance upon the legislature's police power over
all forms of property reduces its reference to the public trust to the
status of a mere make-weight.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is hoped that future proposals of reform in Texas groundwater
law will be considered on their merits rather than shunted aside by
the smokescreen of claimed invincibility of landowner property in
groundwater.
One must be careful not to read into the words "ownership" and
"property" meanings that are not there. The tendency to do so has
created much confusion in many areas of law. Several years ago,
Dean Frank Trelease challenged the misuse of these terms in certain
water law controversies. One of his observations is especially
pertinent:
[I]f we were to say, 'ownership of property gives the right to do with it
as the owner please,' and reason from there, we would reach all sorts of
absurd results."8

87. See In re Adjudication of the Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the
Guadalupe River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 445 (Tex. 1982). The court quoted with approval the

following from an opinion by the Supreme Court of Oregon:
[W]ater rights, like all other rights, are subject to such reasonable regulation as are essential to the general welfare, peace, and good order of the citizens of the state, to the end
that the use of water by one, however absolute and unqualified his right thereto, shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others entitled to the equal privilege of using water
from the same source, nor injurious to the rights of the public.
Id. at 445 (emphasis added). The Upper Guadalupe court also relied upon a decision upholding legislative termination of several mineral interests, to which the public trust concept is
inapplicable. See id. at 445-46 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)).
88. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638,

649 (1957).
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